William O. Douglas As a Common Law Judge by Urofsky, Melvin I.
ESSAY
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS AS A
COMMON LAW JUDGE
MELVIN I. UROFSKY*
Few Justices of the United States Supreme Court created as much
controversy during their lifetimes as did William 0. Douglas.1 During
his record thirty-six years on the bench, he forcefully spoke on issues as
wide-ranging as American foreign affairs and the environment; traveled
around the world, visiting "strange lands and strange people";2 wrote
dozens of books and articles on a variety of topics aimed at the general
public; 3 and divorced and remarried three times.4 In addition, he cham-
pioned the liberal position on nearly every issue before the Court. Justice
Douglas's political and judicial liberalism, as well as his idiosyncratic
lifestyle, infuriated conservatives. In 1970, these conservatives, led by
then-Congressman Gerald R. Ford, attempted to impeach him.5
Of course, Douglas has not been without his champions. Upon his
retirement from the Court, his former pupil, lifelong friend, and occa-
sional colleague, Abe Fortas, declared that "[t]hroughout his life, Doug-
las has fiercely occupied high ground-the highest that life on this earth
offers. He is, of course, an idealist; but, for him, ideals are not abstrac-
tions; they are objectives demanding present fulfillment."'6 One of his
favorite law clerks, Vern Countryman, wrote extensively on Douglas and
the enduring impact his opinions and dissents have had on American
* Professor of History, Virginia Commonwealth University. B.A., Columbia University,
1961; Ph.D., Columbia University, 1968; J.D., University of Virginia, 1983.
1. Justice William 0. Douglas served on the Supreme Court from 1939-1975.
2. WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, STRANGE LANDS AND FRIENDLY PEOPLE 317 (1951); see also id.
at 291-327 (recounting his trip abroad through the Middle East and into India, and criticizing Amer-
ican foreign policy in that region).
3. See, e.g., WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, OF MEN AND MOUNTAINS (1950); WILLIAM 0. DOUG-
LAS, Go EAST, YOUNG MAN (1974) [hereinafter Go EAST]; WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, THE COURT
YEARS (1980) [hereinafter COURT YEARS] (autobiographies).
4. See JAMES F. SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEY: THE LIFE OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 404-
06 (1980).
5. See SPECIAL SUBCOMM. OF HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM., 91ST CONG., 2D SESS., FINAL RE-
PORT ON H.R. RES. 920 (Comm. Print 1970). The subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee
assigned to look into the charges found them all lacking in substance. See id. at 349.
6. Abe Fortas, William 0. Douglas: An Appreciation, 51 IND. L.J. 3, 3 (1975).
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constitutional development. 7 Others have written more specifically on
his contributions to the First Amendment freedoms of speech 8 and reli-
gion,9 civil rights,10 and especially privacy.11
A decade after his death in January 1980, William 0. Douglas re-
mains a figure surrounded by controversies concerned with his jurispru-
dence or lack of it. This Article will first examine some of that criticism,
and then suggest that one way to evaluate his contributions to American
constitutional development is to view him as a common law judge. A
definition of common law judging will be offered, and then some of
Douglas's most important (and most controversial) decisions will be ex-
amined against that definition. The Article will thus demonstrate that
despite the criticism, Justice Douglas not only utilized a coherent ap-
proach in his judging, but significantly contributed to the growth of
American constitutional law in the mid-twentieth century.
I. DOUGLAS AND His CRITICS
Criticism of Douglas can be divided into two categories. First, as a
political judge he decided cases according to the results his political
views dictated. Thus, as a liberal, he believed in a right of privacy, 12
stringent limits on government intrusion, 13 and in the rights of illegiti-
mate children. 14 The second criticism, derived from the first, is that he
did not develop a coherent, acceptable legal analysis in his decisions so
that scholars and other judges could draw a useful pattern from his opin-
ions. Rather, Douglas went right from question to result with only the
7. See, eg., Veto Countryman, The Contribution of the Douglas Dissent, 10 GA. L. REv. 331
(1976); Vern Countryman, Even-Handed Justice, 11 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 233 (1976); Vern
Countryman, Justice Douglas and Freedom of Expression, 1978 U. ILL. L.F. 301. Countryman also
edited a representative sampling of Douglas's Court work. VERN COUNTRYMAN, THE DOUGLAS
OPINIONS (1977).
8. See Maury Maverick, Jr., Douglas and the First Amendment-Visiting Old Battlegrounds,
28 BAYLOR L. REv. 235 (1976); Lucas A. Powe, Jr., Evolution to Absolutism: Justice Douglas and
the First Amendment, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 371 (1974); Lucas A. Powe, Jr., Justice Douglas After
Fifty Years: The First Amendment, McCarthyism and Rights, 6 CONST. COMMENTARY 267 (1989)
[hereinafter Powe, Douglas After Fifty Years].
9. See Nadine Strossen, The Religion Clause Writings of Justice William . Douglas, in "HE
SHALL NOT PASS THIS WAY AGAIN": THE LEGACY OF JUSTICE WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 91 (Ste-
phen L. Wasby ed., 1990) [hereinafter LEGACY OF JUSTICE DOUGLAS].
10. See Drew S. Days III, Justice William . Douglas and Civil Rights, in LEGACY OF JUSTICE
DOUGLAS, supra note 9, at 109.
11. See Dorothy J. Glancy, Getting Government Off the Backs of People: The Right of Privacy
and Freedom of Expression in the Opinions of Justice William . Douglas, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
1047 (1981); Sheldon S. Adler, Note, Toward a Constitutional Theory of Individuality: The Privacy
Opinions of Justice Douglas, 87 YALE L.J. 1579 (1978).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 94-100.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 122-28.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 110-12.
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barest justification, or with a rationale that stretched a tenuous or unac-
ceptable mode of reasoning.
Criticism of Douglas and his activist colleagues on the Stone
Court-notably Hugo Black and Frank Murphy-came early in Doug-
las's career. Within the Court, Felix Frankfurter, the self-proclaimed in-
heritor of the mantle of judicial self-restraint from Holmes and Brandeis,
attacked the "Axis," as he termed them, for their failure to follow his
lead and to adhere to strict standards of judicial decisionmaking.1 5 The
willingness of Douglas and the other activists to overturn prior deci-
sions 16 and to expand the reach of the Bill of Rights17 also elicited com-
plaints from some lower court judges, such as Learned Hand, who
shared much of Frankfurter's anger toward the "Axis."' 8
Thomas Reed Powell, a professor at the Harvard Law School and a
friend of both Douglas and Frankfurter, lamented (only partially in jest)
that he was afraid to meet his classes on Monday until after the Court
handed down its opinions. In this way, he would know what Douglas
and the other activists had done, and whether the law that had been that
morning still held true in the afternoon.1 9
Yosal Rogat, in a 1964 review of two of Douglas's books, exempli-
fied the two major criticisms of Douglas. He charged that Douglas, de-
spite his avowed support of judicial restraint, 20 "rejects the austerity and
detachment traditionally imposed upon a judge. Indeed, he has come to
think of himself as no mere judge, but [as] a moralist, a political vision-
15. See Melvin I. Urofsky, Conflict Among the Brethren: Felix Frankfurter, William 0. Doug-
las and the Clash of Personalities and Philosophies on the United States Supreme Court, 1988 DUKE
L.J. 71, 84-113; see also JAMES F. SIMON, THE ANTAGONISTS: HUGO BLACK, FELIX FRANK-
FURTER AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN MODERN AMERICA 105-29 (1989).
16. See, eg., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (overruling
Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940)).
17. See, eg., Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) (expanding the reach of the First
Amendment).
18. Hand wrote:
[Tihose reforming colleagues of yours. As soon as they convince the people that they can
do what they want, the people will demand of them that they do what the people want. I
wonder whether in times of bland reaction-[and] they are coming-Hillbilly Hugo
[Black], Good Old Bill [Douglas] and Jesus lover of my Soul [Murphy] will like that.
Letter from Learned Hand to Felix Frankfurter (Feb. 6, 1944) (available in Felix Frankfurter Pa-
pers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.).
19. Letter from Thomas Reed Powell to William 0. Douglas (Mar. 28, 1944) (available in
Thomas Reed Powell Papers, Harvard Law School Library, Cambridge, Mass.).
20. "It is the very essence of a government of laws that the predilections of judges not carry the
day, and that the law as written by the lawmakers be applied equally to all. This I had assumed to be
elementary." William O. Douglas, On Misconception of the Judicial Function and the Responsibility
of the Bar, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 227, 227 (1959).
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ary, a universal philosopher. ' 21 These traits, Rogat claimed, informed
not only Douglas's books, but his court opinions as well:
[A] case does not present a tangle of competing principles, but a single
transcendent principle-for instance, free speech or religious free-
dom-which need only be identified for the solution to be plain. In
this way, he avoids the task, so basic to legal analysis, of reconciling
competing principles. Instead, he substitutes simple labels and lines:
"the abuse of speech can be punished but the right itself cannot be."
Unfortunately, few cases are so simple. 22
Rogat went on to castigate Douglas for the carelessness of his opinions
and his indifference to legal analysis. Rogat attributed this slipshod juris-
prudence to Douglas's "exclusively political conception of the judicial
role." 23
Shortly after Douglas retired from the Court, Bernard Wolfman, a
professor of tax law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School,
weighed in with an analysis of Douglas's votes in the 278 federal tax
cases decided during his tenure on the bench. 24 Wolfman found that in
his early years on the Court, Douglas wrote many tax opinions sustaining
the Government's positions. Yet he began to dissent, usually in favor of
the taxpayer:
And he often dissented alone, without opinion, or with only a few
words. In the last decade and a half particularly, Douglas' positions in
tax cases have been marked by a strong disposition in favor of taxpay-
ers' positions, a lack of sympathy with the administration of the Inter-
nal Revenue Service... and an increasing failure to explain his votes
in well-reasoned opinions.25
The most sustained attack on Douglas's judicial record has come
from G. Edward White.26 White castigates Douglas for rejecting "both
of the principal twentieth-century devices designed to constrain subjec-
tive judicial lawmaking: fidelity to constitutional text or doctrine, and
institutional deference."'27 White subjects Douglas's autobiographical
writings to an extensive psychological analysis because he believes that
21. Yosal Rogat, Mr. Justice Pangloss, N.Y. REv. OF Bs., Oct. 22, 1964, at 5, 5 (reviewing
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, THE ANATOMY OF LIBERTY (1963) and WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, FREEDOM
OF THE MIND (1964)).
22. Id. at 6.
23. Id.
24. BERNARD WOLFMAN ET AL., DISSENT WITHOUT OPINION: THE BEHAVIOR OF JUSTICE
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS IN FEDERAL TAX CASES (1975). An earlier version appeared as Bernard
Wolfman et al., The Behavior of Justice Douglas in Federal Tax Cases, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 235
(1973).
25. WOLFMAN, supra note 24, at 4.
26. See G. Edward White, The Anti-Judge: William 0. Douglas and the Ambiguities of Individ-
uality, 74 VA. L. REv. 17 (1988).
27. Id. at 18.
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the "compelling personal themes of Douglas's life have deep ramifica-
tions for his professional life, especially his career as a Supreme Court
Justice."2 8
The chief lesson that White would have us draw is that from child-
hood on, Douglas saw himself as a loner, and that he purposefully cre-
ated, through his writings and his activities, a public image of himself as
an individualist. Douglas the environmentalist, Douglas the iconoclast,
Douglas the dissenter; all built upon and in turn fostering the persona of
the loner who rejected the rigid mores of middle-class society. Yet, as
White notes, much of the autobiographical writings are unreliable and
contradictory. These writings set out "to present to us one description of
a life-the triumph of a man who was true to his individuality-and ends
up presenting us with quite another description, the trials of a man who
could not escape his individual torment. '2 9
Since John Marshall's time, the Court has operated under certain
collegial patterns designed to develop a consensus among the Justices
and present a unified appearance to outsiders. Douglas, however,
"seemed to have demonstrated an indifference to those norms almost
from the beginnings of his tenure." 30 White locates the origins of this
attitude in two events that Douglas described in his memoirs. The first
event occurred during his first term on the bench when Douglas joined
the majority in O'Malley v. Woodrough 31 to sustain the constitutionality
of a 1932 statute that subjected the salaries of federal judges to federal
income tax.3 2 His vote in that case, Douglas later recalled, changed his
entire outlook on appropriate judicial behavior:
I decided that I had just voted myself first-class citizenship. The tradi-
tion had been that Justices never even voted in public elections. ... I
took a different course. Since I would be paying as heavy an income
tax as my neighbor, I decided to participate in local, state, and national
affairs .... That meant I would register and vote; ... that I would
become immersed in conservation... ; that I would travel and speak
out on foreign affairs. 33
Douglas's second revelation, which Douglas himself characterized
as "shattering but... true," came during a conversation with Chief Jus-
tice Charles Evans Hughes: "'[Y]ou must remember one thing[,]'"
Hughes said, "'[a]t the constitutional level where we work, ninety per-
28. Id.
29. Id. at 40.
30. Id. at 43.
31. 307 U.S. 277 (1939).
32. See id. at 282. The challenge to the Revenue Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 154, 47 Stat. 169,
rested on Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, which forbids Congress to reduce a federal
judge's salary during that judge's term of office. See U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § 1.
33. Go EAST, supra note 3, at 466.
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cent of any decision is emotional. The rational part of us supplies the
reasons for supporting our predilections.' ",34 Douglas claimed that
before this conversation, he had "thought of the law in the terms of
Moses-principles chiseled in granite. '35 He knew that judges had
predilections, but had believed that they never allowed "gut reactions" to
determine their decisions. Hughes's comment, said Douglas, "destroyed
in my mind some of the reverence for immutable principles. '36
Yet Professor White notes that to accept Douglas's account of these
two episodes at face value is "to ignore his entire career as a legal aca-
demic." 37 Although not a constitutional scholar, Douglas had been one
of the leaders of the Realist movement at Yale,38 and certainly knew the
ideas of men such as Benjamin Cardozo, Jerome Frank, and Karl Llewel-
lyn-all of whom had discussed the role of personal predilection in judi-
cial decisionmaking. 39 White contends that, aside from the question of
veracity, it appears that Douglas utilized these incidents as a post hoc
rationalization of his later behavior. White asserts:
Douglas went on the Court with a rather different calculus, one that
rested on the assumption that because law was, at bottom, a collection
of the predilections of judges, the political ideology of a Justice was the
most significant dimension of his service and should not be suppressed.
The remainder of Douglas' career can be seen as consistent with that
assumption. Because he believed that law was, fundamentally, nothing
more than politics, he took no pains to avoid open participation in
public affairs unless, as he put it, "a particular issue was likely to get
into the Court, and unless the activity was plainly political or parti-
san.".. . The doctrinal dimensions of judging, for Douglas, were rela-
tively insignificant; what counted were the results in cases and the
political philosophies that those results signified....
... That is why legions of commentators and the Justices with
whom he served found him, although one of the most intellectually
talented persons ever appointed to the Court, to be strangely uninter-
ested in the doctrinal underpinnings of his opinions.4°
Thus, Professor White finds that because Douglas was result oriented,
the political ideology of the judge being the most important factor, he
was uninterested in the doctrinal support of his opinions.
34. COURT YEARS, supra note 3, at 8.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. White, supra note 26, at 45.
38. See LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960, at 9 (1986).
39. See, eg., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); JE-
ROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurispru-
dence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930).
40. White, supra note 26, at 46, 48.
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It was not a question of whether Douglas could write a sustained
analysis-clearly he could.41 Rather, he did not consider such analysis
necessary. If judges were, in fact, no different than legislators, then the
bottom line of their decisions involved only a question of right or wrong,
measured against whatever moral or political standards held by that par-
ticular judge.
To support his charges, Professor White analyzes Douglas's record
in Rosenberg v. United States,42 as well as his opinions in key cases that
expanded the coverage of the Equal Protection Clause.43 One of the
most controversial cases decided during Douglas's tenure, Rosenberg in-
volved the Rosenbergs' appeal of the death sentence following their con-
viction for espionage.44 The Court went through several twists and turns
before finally refusing to hear the appeal; 45 Felix Frankfurter described
the episode as "the most disturbing single experience I have had during
my term of service on the Court."'46
Despite Douglas's self-portrayal as a champion of the underdog,
fighting against the McCarthyism rampant not only in the country but
also on the Court,47 subsequent studies showed that Douglas constantly
changed his position on whether the Court should accept the appeal for a
full hearing. Indeed, his decision to vote against accepting the appeal
was the decisive vote.48 James Simon, in his generally sympathetic biog-
raphy of Douglas, agrees that his votes in the Rosenberg case "seemed so
inconsistent with his whole judicial approach and philosophy.... Doug-
las seemed content to let the Rosenbergs go to their execution without
even hearing a variety of legal arguments put to the Court by the Rosen-
berg attorneys." 49
According to White, the Rosenberg case illustrates Douglas's ap-
proach to judicial involvement in political questions. Where previous
scholars saw Douglas's actions as self-serving or even hypocritical, White
41. See, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v.
Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940). Professor White found that in these opinions Douglas engaged in a
thorough and detailed analysis of commerce clause and due process issues, but he considers them
exceptions to the rule. See White, supra note 26, at 47 n.159.
42. 346 U.S. 273 (1953); see White, supra note 26, at 48-60.
43. See infra text accompanying notes 77-87 for a discussion of these equal protection cases.
44. See Rosenberg, 346 U.S. at 273.
45. See id. at 288.
46. Felix Frankfurter, Rosenberg Memorandum (June 4, 1953), quoted in Michael E. Parrish,
Cold War Justice: The Supreme Court and the Rosenbergs, 82 AM. HIST. REv. 805, 808 (1977).
47. See COURT YEARS, supra note 3, at 78-82. There has been much controversy over the guilt
or innocence of the Rosenbergs, as well as the fairness of the legal process that condemned them to
death. See, e.g., Louis NIZER, THE IMPLOSION CONSPIRACY (1973); WALTER SCHNEIR & MIRIAM
SCHNEIR, INVITATION TO AN INQUEST: A NEW LOOK AT THE RoSENBERG-SOBELL CASE (1968).
48. See Parrish, supra note 46, at 832.
49. SIMON, supra note 4, at 312.
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sees them as consistent with his belief that Court deliberations should
reflect and further politically conscious ideology.50
In sum, White views Douglas as having evolved into an "anti-
judge"; a judge who ignored the essential doctrinal and jurisdictional
constraints that separate law from politics. He speaks of Douglas as the
most outspoken "activist" judge of this century; one who "regarded his
task as a Supreme Court Justice to be that of translating his views of
social policy into law, with 'law' being the thin veneer of doctrine that
somehow made those views acceptable." 51
II. DOUGLAS AND THE COMMON LAW
All of the criticisms leveled against Douglas derive primarily from
his willingness to go outside the allegedly accepted forms of judicial anal-
ysis, to reach out to find justification for particular results, and to intrude
in areas supposedly the concern of the legislatures. None of the critics
pays any attention to the fact that these traits are all part of the common
law tradition. If we measure Douglas's record against the experience of
the common law, with its emphasis on adaptability and flexibility, we get
a much different and much more positive view of Douglas as a judge.
Professor G. Edward White's lament that Douglas ignored the prin-
cipal modes of modern analysis does not greatly differ from complaints
made nearly a century ago against jurists who doggedly adhered to the
accepted legal lockstep of the time. In his classic analysis of reform
thought at the end of the nineteenth and in the early twentieth century,
Morton White described this dominant form of social philosophy as "for-
malism."' 52 Formalism represented the triumph and the stultification of
the ideas of European philosophers such as Hegel, Kant, and Bentham,
who emphasized rigid rules and an abstract interpretation of the real
world. In jurisprudence, law was viewed as an abstract entity, with im-
mutable values; judges could discover these values by applying the cor-
50. See White, supra note 26, at 65. For a defense of Douglas's actions in the case, see William
Cohen, Justice Douglas and the Rosenberg Case Setting the Record Straight, 70 CORNELL L. REv.
211 (1985), responding to Parrish, supra note 46. Cohen views Douglas as acting consistently in
light of his belief that the Court should only consider specific questions before it. Douglas opposed
granting review when there were no such questions, changed his mind when presented with new
facts, and then retreated when it appeared that these would not affect the results. See also Michael
E. Parrish, Justice Douglas and the Rosenberg Case: A Rejoinder, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 1048 (1985)
(rejecting Cohen's views on Douglas's motives for withdrawing his memorandum in support of
granting certiorari and arguing that Douglas, as in other controversial cases, "attempted to straddle
the issues" in order to protect his liberal self-image while allowing treasonous behavior to be
punished).
51. White, supra note 26, at 80.
52. MORTON WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM
(1949).
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rect rules of analysis.53  This view of law also assumed a strong
correlation with ethics; the discovery of the correct legal principle to ap-
ply in a particular case would mean that the correct moral judgment had
also been made.54 The problem with formalism, however, was that it
bore no relation to reality. This defect was exposed by Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. in The Common Law.55
Writing after sixteen years on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts, Holmes attacked the idea that "a given word or even a given
collocation of words has one meaning and no other. A word generally
has several meanings, even in the dictionary. You have to consider the
sentence in which it stands to decide which of those meanings it bears in
the particular case .... -56 The "law" itself, therefore, could never be
precisely defined, and Holmes declared that the study of law could do
little more than point to certain outcomes: "The prophecies of what the
courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by
the law."57
Holmes's realism, as Morton White suggested, consisted of "re-
jecting the view that law is an abstract entity present as the meaning of a
given statute, waiting to be found by a judge. On the contrary it is, in
great measure, made by the judge."58 This is clear in Holmes's famous
battle-cry against legal formalism with which he began his Lowell
lectures:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intu-
itions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices
which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more
to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should
be governed. The law embodies the story of a nation's development
through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained
only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics.5 9
53. I do not wish to imply that Professor White calls for, or holds as an ideal, a rigid and
doctrinaire form of analysis as the only legitimate means of constitutional interpretation. But in
charging Douglas with "reject[ing] both of the principal twentieth-century devices to constrain sub-
jective judicial lawmaking: fidelity to constitutional text or doctrine, and institutional deference,"
White, supra note 26, at 18, I believe that White has imposed a formalistic standard not dissimilar in
its belief in a "right" way to that to which Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. objected.
54. See id. at 65 ("[Douglas] would likely have described Rosenberg, or any other case, as
simply an opportunity for the 'right' values to triumph.").
55. OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881).
56. OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., The Theory of Legal Interpretation, in COLLECTED LEGAL PA-
PERS 203 (1920).
57. OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note
56, at 167, 173.
58. WiHrrE, supra note 52, at 8.
59. HOLMES, supra note 55, at 1.
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The Lowell lectures dealt with the common law-the means by
which Anglo-American law has kept in step with social and economic
realities for the past several centuries. It has been said that the common
law:
is not a codification of exact or inflexible rules for human conduct,....
but is rather the embodiment of broad and comprehensive unwritten
principles, inspired by natural reason and an innate sense of justice
The inherent capacity of the common law for growth and change
is its most significant feature.6°
Although legislatures may statutorily amend or even abolish com-
mon law rules, it is debatable whether, and to what extent, courts them-
selves should develop new law when confronted with competing
principles of social policy. Those who advocate judicial restraint argue
that the legislative branch alone should promulgate new laws, and that
the judges have no role in this activity.61 The opposing, or "activist,"
view was stated by Justice Marcus Kaufman of the California Supreme
Court: "The courts are the custodians of the common law-not the
economists, or the legislators, or even the law professors. We abdicate
that duty when we abjure decision of common law questions under the
guise of "deference" to the political branches." 62 This view has also been
urged by legal scholars such as Arthur Corbin, who wrote:
It is the function of our courts to keep the doctrines up to date with the
mores by continual restatement and by giving them a continually new
content. This is judicial legislation, and the judge legislates at his peril.
Nevertheless, it is the necessity and duty of such legislation that gives
to judicial office its highest honor; and no brave and honest judge
shirks the duty or fears the peril. 63
This description seems to capture the charges against Douglas. Indeed,
instead of portraying Douglas negatively, they allow us to see Douglas in
a different and perhaps more favorable light: as a common law judge on
the nation's highest court.
Most simply, the common law is judge-made law; a body of general
rules and precedents that grow out of specific cases, which judges then
60. Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 525 P.2d 669, 676 (Cal. 1974).
61. See, eg., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532 (1989) (Scalia, J., con-
curring) (charging that the decision has "needlessly... prolong[ed] this Court's self-awarded sover-
eignty over a field where it has little proper business, since the answers to most of the cruel questions
posed are political and juridical").
62. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 417 (Cal. 1988) (Kaufman, J., concurring
and dissenting).
63. Arthur L. Corbin, The Offer of an Act for a Promise, 29 YALE L.J. 767, 771-72 (1920)
(footnote omitted).
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apply to current cases with similar fact situations. The common law tra-
dition strove for a generalized rule, which would allow judges flexibility
in individual cases; stare decisis, by which prior decisions governed pres-
ent cases, was never a rigid doctrine. 64 Just as the courts of equity in-
jected compassion into the rigidity of law, so could a common law judge
tailor the law to meet the circumstances of the present case.65
Although statutory law always overrode common law, in the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries legislation usually focused on nar-
row, specific targets---company charters, tariffs, funding for a canal,
defining criminal activity, and other such issues. This allowed judges
some leeway in their interpretation of statutes when the issues were
broader than those narrowly defined by the legislatures.66 This did not
mean, however, that they could decide cases on whims; the glory of the
common law lay in its combination of a general system of overriding
rules that nonetheless allowed growth and change to meet new needs. 67
Thus, under the common law, judges make law, not just interpret it.
This raises questions as to whether common law flexibility is legitimate in
constitutional interpretation. 68 Some commentators believe that judges
are bound by the original intent of the Framers, and that constitutional
interpretation consists of nothing more than discovering that intent.69
Others view the common law as a means by which social inequities can
be remedied, even within the confines of the Constitution.70
The common law judge, then, operates within a body of general
rules and principles, but is ever mindful that as social and economic con-
ditions change, the law must so adapt. When conditions warrant, the
64. See, e.g., United States v. Connor, 926 F.2d 81, 83 (lst Cir. 1991) ("[S]tare decisis is not a
rigid, inflexible rule.").
65. See GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977) (describing the rise of the
common law tradition in the United States).
66. Judges, of course, operate in a legal system that combines both statutory and common law;
however, statutory law has assumed a far more dominant position in recent years. The survival, and
indeed even growth, of common law in this condition is explored in GuIDo CALABRESI, A COMMON
LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 163-66 (1982).
67. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 17-25 (1973) (discussing
how judges altered the common law of the eighteenth century to meet the rapidly changing condi-
tions of nineteenth-century America); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERI-
CAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977) (same).
68. See RANDALL BRIDWELL & RALPH U. WHITfEN, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COM-
MON LAW 136 (1977).
69. The literature on this topic is extensive and rapidly expanded during the 1980s. For the
views of one of the leading exponents of original intent, see Edwin Meese III, Construing the Consti-
tution, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 2 (1985).
70. See, eg., CHARLES M. HAAR & DANIEL W. FESSLER, THE WRONG SIDE OF THE TRACKS
227-33 (1986) (advocating using the doctrine of equal services to address the present-day problem of
inequity in commercial services and facilities).
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common law judge thus feels free to change or even abandon precedent
to create new law that addresses the problems at hand. This judicial
lawmaking can take place in a court of common pleas or even in the
United States Supreme Court.
III. DOUGLAS AND RESULTS
The charge of judicial activism put forth by White and others ig-
nores an important fact: Douglas was often "right, ' 71 and in a way that
won the support not only of his colleagues on the bench, but also of the
American public. Only the academy has failed to appreciate fully the
approach Douglas brought to the bench.
Erwin N. Griswold, in his Foreword to the Wolfman analysis of
Douglas's tax opinions,72 recalled that about a year after Douglas took
his seat on the Court, he wrote the opinion in Helvering v. Clifford,73
which Griswold describes as "surely one of the strongest pro-government
tax cases in the books."' 74 But Griswold goes on to say:
From an Olympian point of view, the result may well have seemed
desirable. But there was little, if anything, in the statute to support it.
Nor was it the culmination of a series of decisions, slowly etching out a
new ground in the law. Even today, it seems to have been a rather
strong case of judicial law-making. Ultimately, it has, on the whole,
worked out quite well. However, there was at first an enormous
amount of litigation. Several years later, the Treasury undertook to
clarify the situation with comprehensive regulations. Finally, in 1954,
fourteen years after the Clifford decision, Congress enacted detailed
statutory provisions .... It may well be that this result never would
have been reached without the bold action of the Supreme Court in the
Clifford case.75
Professor White further asserts that Douglas suffered an "unwilling-
ness to buttress the results he reached in cases by resort to the common
analytical techniques employed by twentieth-century Justices as justifica-
71. I use the word "right" in the same sense that Professor White uses it-that the observer
intuitively recognizes the correctness of a particular question or answer given the fact situation in the
larger context of contemporary moral views. See White, supra note 26, at 60-65.
72. Erwin N. Griswold, Foreword to WOLFMAN, supra note 24, at ix.
73. 309 U.S. 331 (1940). Clifford involved a taxpayer who created a short-term trust over
which he exercised full control as trustee, although the income went to his wife. The Commissioner
of Revenue ruled that because the taxpayer had established the trust merely to avoid taxes, and had
in effect retained full control of the assets, he must therefore bear the tax consequences. Justice
Douglas ruled that since section 61(a) of the Revenue Act of 1934 did not address the issue of short-
term trusts with great clarity, the trier of fact could determine whether a trustee had, as a practical
matter, rights associated with ownership, and, if so, the accruing tax liability. See id. at 338.
74. Griswold, supra note 72, at x.
75. Id. at x-xi (footnote omitted). There are only a few citations to proper cases in the decision,
but Justice Douglas's analysis of the meanings of property rights and ownership are by no means
fanciful or farfetched.
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tory devices." 76 Professor White uses two cases to illustrate Douglas un-
dertaking novel doctrinal analysis without extensive justificatory effort:
Skinner v. Oklahoma 77 and Griswold v. Connecticut.78 According to
White, both decisions were:
doctrinally audacious opinions whose innovativeness was cryptically,
even assertively presented; both involved end runs around apparently
insurmountable analytical barriers; and both touched upon a theme-
the decision to procreate and thus to pass on one's legacy of individual-
ity to one's progeny and hence to posterity-that touched deep cur-
rents in Douglas' life. 7 9
Skinner involved an Oklahoma statute that mandated sterilization
for habitual criminals.80 Justice Holmes, in an earlier opinion supporting
a Virginia sterilization law for persons with hereditary imbecility or in-
sanity, had seemingly cut off any equal protection argument by deriding
it as "the usual last resort of constitutional arguments." 81 The abuse of
substantive due process in the 1920s and 1930s had made that avenue
equally unattractive, especially after the Court, in West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish8 2 abjured using the Fourteenth Amendment to second-guess
legislative judgments.
Douglas, as White points out, was faced with a jurisprudential envi-
ronment that seemingly negated both due process and equal protection
arguments. Yet, he cut through the Gordian knot by noting that the law
did not apply equally to all felons because it made an exception for em-
bezzlers. 83 This opened the door to equal protection analysis, and Doug-
las charged through. He identified the right to procreate as a
fundamental right, and concluded that any legislation restricting that
right would be subject to strict judicial scrutiny.8 4  Because the
Oklahoma law did not apply equally to all, it thus failed the constitu-
tional test.85
White denounces Douglas's opinion in several ways: that the Equal
Protection Clause lay dormant, if not moribund, and was thus an inap-
propriate device to guarantee such rights; that the Court had never
before identified procreation as a fundamental right; that Douglas did not
offer a single cite to justify this decision; that he connected fundamental
76. White, supra note 26, at 65.
77. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
78. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
79. White, supra note 26, at 66.
80. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, §§ 171-195 (West 1937).
81. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
82. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
83. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 538-39, 541-42; White, supra note 26, at 66-68.
84. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
85. See id. at 541-42.
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fights to a strict scrutiny standard without any support for this assertion;
that he pronounced the "invidious discrimination" in the law's enforce-
ment as its chief evil; and that all this was "advanced without any textual
or doctrinal support. '86
Yet Douglas decided the case correctly, and in so doing breathed life
back into the Equal Protection Clause. As White himself notes, in the
twenty-three years between Skinner and Griswold, the Court began to
make more substantive judgments on equal protection claims, and it
adopted the same analytic model that Douglas created in Skinner.8 7
But why was it bad when Douglas engaged in that type of analysis
in 1942? Was it because, as Professor White claims, Douglas had made
this analysis without "any textual or doctrinal support"?88 Does it then
become acceptable for another justice to apply that model in 195689 or in
196390 because now there is a precedent for it-namely, Douglas's opin-
ion in Skinner?
If one case represents Douglas's willingness to be creative in reach-
ing a particular result, it is surely Griswold.91 Griswold involved the
challenge of a Comstock-era Connecticut statute that completely prohib-
ited the use of contraceptive devices. Because the law applied to all per-
sons, an equal protection claim seemed precluded. With a liberty
argument under the Due Process Clause still apparently blocked by the
legacy of the 1930s, 92 Douglas had to engage in a highly creative and
controversial analysis that found "emanations" and "penumbras" 93 in
various guarantees of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amend-
ments to create a constitutionally protected zone of privacy.94 From this
86. White, supra note 26, at 68.
87. See id. at 68-69.
88. Id. at 68.
89. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (requiring that indigent defendants be furnished
with trial transcripts; Justice Black wrote the Court's opinion utilizing an equal protection analysis).
90. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963) (Justice Douglas wrote the Court's
brief opinion requiring states to appoint counsel for indigent defendants at the first appeal stage; he
cited Griffin for the equal protection analysis involving poverty as an invidious distinction.).
91. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
92. See, eg., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412
(1908); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
93. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. Justice Douglas, however, did not invent the idea of a penum-
bral doctrine. A noted law dictionary traces it to an early federal eminent domain decision, Kohl v.
United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875). BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1135 (6th ed. 1990). Further,
Justice Holmes used the notion of "the penumbra of the Fourth and Fifth amendments" nearly 40
years before Griswold in his dissent in the subsequently discredited wiretap case, Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 469 (1928). For a discussion of penumbral doctrine in prior legal reasoning, see
Dorothy J. Glancy, Douglas's Right to Privacy: A Response to His Critics, in LEGACY OF JUSTICE
DOUGLAS, supra note 9, at 160-62.
94. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
[Vol. 41:133
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS
he concluded that a "right" to privacy existed-a right "older than the
Bill of Rights."95 In this context, the right to privacy was implicated
because the association of marriage was "intimate to the degree of being
sacred."' 96 Thus, Connecticut's invasion of this right to privacy was not
constitutionally permissible. Douglas did not engage in an extended
analysis or elaboration of the results in Griswold; "the justification for the
results was ultimately that they were overwhelmingly morally 'right.' "97
According to Professor White, "the significance of Douglas' Gris-
wold opinion was not that it chose the rubric of privacy on which to
justify its result, but that it responded to what appeared to be a doctrinal
impasse by simply creating constitutional doctrine on the spot, as Doug-
las had done in Skinner. '98 White, it should be added, concedes that the
basic questions asked in both cases had obvious answers, the very an-
swers provided by Douglas.99 The only difficulties in reaching these an-
swers, according to White, "were analytical, created by the presence of
awkward doctrinal barriers. Douglas simply disregarded those barriers
and created some new doctrine." °
Douglas recognized that his reasoning and mode of argument were
often unconventional. Rather than look merely to the relevant prece-
dents, Douglas, like all good common law judges, contemplated all the
facts surrounding a case.' 0 t The Douglas opinion in Griswold can best be
described as "deliberately open-textured and suggestive, rather than
closely argued and definitive," 10 2 but "[t]he fact that this type of impres-
sionistic reasoning is unconventional does not necessarily mean that it is
wrong."1 03
95. Id. at 486.
96. Id.
97. White, supra note 26, at 71.
98. Id. at 70.
99. "Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for tell-tale
signs of contraceptives?" and "Should we allow the state to sterilize the chicken thief but not the
embezzler?" should, of course, be answered in the negative.
100. White, supra note 26, at 71.
101. Justice Brandeis, for example, lectured his brethren that "[t]he judgment should be based
upon a consideration of relevant facts, actual or possible--exfactojus oritur. That ancient rule must
prevail in order that we may have a system of living law." Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 600
(1917) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). For Dorothy Glancy's comparison of Douglas's examination in
Griswold of "all sorts of legal rules and decisions in order to find the principle underlying them" to
what Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren did in their pioneering 1890 article on the common law
right to privacy, Samuel Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193
(1890), see Glancy, supra note 93, at 162.
102. Glancy, supra note 93, at 162.
103. Id. Professor Jan Deutsch of Yale Law School clerked for Potter Stewart during the 1962
Term, and he reports great frustration with Justice Douglas's opinions. He would meet with Doug-
las's clerk, Jerome Falk, and would say "Jerry, it doesn't work. It does not work!" Then Falk would
show him that it did work, because Douglas did not take just the bare holdings, but all the glosses
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Commentators have been troubled with Griswold since its inception.
Dinesh D'Sousa could find no right to privacy in the Constitution:
""Hold it up to the light, read it backwards in the mirror-still noth-
ing." 104 Robert Bork condemned Douglas's analysis, claiming that the
penumbral "right of privacy strikes without warning. It has no intellec-
tual structure to it so you don't know in advance to what it applies." 10 5
Thomas Emerson worried about "the vagueness of the concept, and the
general lack of precise standards";106 while Paul Kauper condemned the
"accordion-like qualities of the emanations-and-penumbra theory."10 7
And yet, Americans intuitively believe in a right to privacy, and that
it ought to be constitutionally protected.108 Years ago Justice Louis D.
Brandeis declared: "The makers of our Constitution ... sought to pro-
tect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their
sensations. They conferred, as against the government, the right to be let
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the. right most valued by
civilized men."' 109 Privacy is a value shared by liberals and conservatives.
Although both groups may question the analysis used to support privacy
as a constitutional right, most agree with the result. And results are ex-
actly what Douglas sbught; he never pretended to be anything other than
a results-oriented judge.
Only results can explain Douglas's rationale in Levy v. Louisiana,110
in which the Court found an equal protection violation in a state law that
denied unacknowledged illegitimate children the right to recover for the
wrongful death of their mother. 1 ' Although Douglas's opinion hinted
that went with earlier opinions, and from those wove his own conclusions. "Most legal scholars at
Yale do not think that glossing matters," Deutsch concluded, "but do you know how hard it is to do
what Douglas did and produce a coherent opinion?" Interview with Jan Deutsch, in New Haven,
Conn. (June 28, 1988).
104. Dinesh D'Sousa, The New Liberal Censorship, POL'Y REV., Fall 1986, at 8, 13.
105. Robert Bork, Foreword to GARY L. McDOWELL, THE CONSTITUTION AND CONTEMPO-
RARY CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, at x (1985).
106. Thomas I. Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MICH. L. REV. 219, 230
(1965).
107. Paul G. Kauper, Penumbras. Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things
Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 MICH. L. REV. 235, 253 (1965). For a defense of Justice Doug-
las's reasoning, and its ties to prior Court decisions and reasoning, see Glancy, supra note 93, at 160-
62; see also Adler, supra note 11, at 1588-95 (explaining Justice Douglas's privacy opinions in the
context of his concept of individuality and view of the Bill of Rights).
108. See Louis HARRIS AND ASSOCIATES & ALAN F. WESTIN, THE DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY:
A NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH SURVEY OF ATrITUDEs TOWARD PRIVACY 15 (1981) (reporting
that more than three-fourths of the surveyed population believe a right of privacy should be on the
same protected level of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness).
109. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
110. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
111. Id. at 71. In a companion case, Justice Douglas wrote for the Court in holding another
Louisiana statute violative of the Equal Protection Clause because it denied a mother recovery for
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at both a simple rationality test and at heightened scrutiny, he did ask
the right questions:
We start from the premise that illegitimate children are not "non-per-
sons." They are humans, live, and have their being.... The rights
asserted here involve the intimate, familial relationship between a child
and his own mother. When the child's claim of damage for loss of his
mother is in issue, why, in terms of "equal protection," should the
tortfeasors go free merely because the child is illegitimate? Why
should the illegitimate child be denied rights merely because of his
birth out of wedlock? He certainly is subject to all the responsibilities
of a citizen, including the payment of taxes and conscription under the
Selective Service Act. How under our constitutional regime can he be
denied correlative rights which other citizens enjoy? 112
Compare the common sense and humanity of this decision to that in
Labine v. Vincent 113 three years later when a new majority upheld a
Louisiana law that subordinated the rights of acknowledged illegitimate
children to those of other relatives in intestate succession. One passage
in Justice Black's brief opinion suggested that there might not be even a
minimal rationality review because "[a]bsent a specific constitutional
guarantee, it is for [the] legislature, not the life-tenured judges of this
Court, to select from among possible laws."114
Results by themselves, of course, are not and should not be the sole
criterion by which we evaluate judicial performance. Much can be said
in favor of the ability to reason from text and precedent, and to defer to
the judgment of the politically elected branches of government in policy
determination. But it is not necessarily anti-democratic for non-elected
judges to make policy, and this is especially true in a common law
setting.
The law needs both continuity and change; it must provide stability
through solid links to the past, yet it must also be responsive to new
social and economic conditions. Although legislatures, through legisla-
tion, provide for both continuity and change, they do so primarily in
gross; that is, the laws they write determine major policies. How these
the wrongful death of an illegitimate child while allowing recovery in the deaths of legitimate chil-
dren. See Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
112. Id. at 70-71 (citation omitted).
113. 401 U.S. 532 (1971), overruled by Trimble v. Gordan, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
114. Id. at 538-39 (citation omitted). Since then the Court has followed what might at best be
called a wavering line in cases involving the rights of illegitimate children. See Weber v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 171-72 (1972) (following Levy in striking down a Louisiana workman
compensation statute giving preference to legitimate children in cases of parental disability); Ma-
thews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 512 (1976) (following Labine in upholding different presumptions
under the Social Security Act for legitimate and illegitimate children attempting to receive parents'
benefits); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 97-101 (1982) (applying equal protection analysis to dif-
ferential time limits imposed on claims for child support for legitimate and illegitimate offspring).
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are actually implemented, how they are applied in fine, is left to the
courts. As Guido Calabresi has argued, this is appropriate. According
to Calabresi, the common law function of courts today is "no more and
no less than the critical task of deciding when a retentionist or a revision-
ist bias is appropriately applied to an existing statutory or common law
rule." '11s Although Calabresi is aware of the problems that an activist
court may cause, he also points out how avoidance of creating new rules
may also stifle the law. 116 Judges who defer to outrageous or no longer
relevant judicial precedents, or to inconsistent or unconscionable legisla-
tive actions, out of a desire for doctrinal consistency are rarely consid-
ered great judges by the history books.
For example, if any Justice of the Supreme Court in this century
might be considered the paragon of "fidelity to constitutional text or doc-
trine, and institutional deference," 117 it would certainly be Felix Frank-
furter. For the twenty-three years he occupied the "scholar's seat"1I 18 on
the Court, Frankfurter wrote law review articles that masqueraded as
judicial opinions, and carried judicial restraint to the point of judicial
abdication. Yet Frankfurter's reputation for jurisprudence has never
been high with scholars, and succeeding justices have largely ignored his
opinions. 119
There is no question that Frankfurter's opinions are more scholarly,
more in the mode of analysis described by Professor White as the
"norm," 120 and more deferential to the legislature. If we evaluate Frank-
furter's opinions by their impact on American constitutional law, how-
ever, they are insignificant. 121 Douglas, by acting as a common law
115. CALABRESI, supra note 66, at 164.
116. See id. at 75; see also MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 5
(1988) (arguing that "in many cases the flexible form of a judicial rule is preferable to the canonical
form of a legislative rule").
117. White, supra note 26, at 18 (referring to Justice Douglas).
118. The scholar's seat was the common appellation used in the 1930s and 1940s to refer to the
seat held by Frankfurter and his predecessors. Horace Gray, who taught at the Harvard Law
School, held the seat from 1881 to 1902; he was succeeded by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who
served until 1932. The scholarly Benjamin Nathan Cardozo replaced Holmes, and Cardozo was
replaced by Professor Felix Frankfurter in 1939.
119. See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (overruling
Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940)); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (over-
ruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949)); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (overruling Cole-
grove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946)).
120. White, supra note 26, at 43.
121. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (11th ed. 1985). In this widely used con-
stitutional law text, the author includes among his principal cases nine Douglas opinions for the
Court and only one written by Frankfurter. In nonprincipal cases, Douglas's opinions are referred
to far more frequently than Frankfurter's. In a major criminal procedure text, STEPHEN A.
SALTZBURG, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES AND COMMENTARY (2d ed. 1984), only
one opinion by Frankfurter is included-a Fourth Amendment case, on which Frankfurter consid-
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judge, by asking the right questions, and by engaging in unorthodox
analysis, reached morally correct results far more often.
For example, in 1959, the Warren Court considered a civil case re-
garding whether city health inspectors could enter premises without a
search warrant.1 22 Nearly everyone on the Court thought of it as a sim-
ple question because the Fourth Amendment had previously been limited
to criminal situations. 123 Frankfurter, who considered the Fourth
Amendment as his private preserve, was assigned to write the majority
opinion. He buttressed it with copious" references to prior rulings to
show that the right to a search warrant did not apply to civil searches. 124
Douglas disagreed, and requested that his clerk, Charles Miller,
work on a dissent. Miller retrieved a multitude of books from the library
and pored through numerous cases; he was unable, however, to find sup-
port for Douglas's dissent. An angry and frustrated Douglas told Miller
to "[b]ring in all the books you got, and let me see what I can do."125
For three days Douglas stayed in his office, working at the materials
Miller had compiled. At the end of that time he "scratched out" ten
pages that, according to Miller, "bowled me over. It was the most per-
suasive thing I had seen in my life." 126
Douglas circulated the draft, and three justices (Warren, Black, and
Brennan) immediately switched their vote. Justice Whittaker almost
joined Douglas, but after intense lobbying by Frankfurter, remained with
the majority through a one-paragraph concurrence.1 27 Eight years later,
the Court overruled the Frankfurter opinion and adopted the Douglas
view that a search conducted by the government-either by criminal di-
vision or civil officials-is still a search and subject to Fourth Amend-
ment protections.128 Whereas Frankfurter's formalistic analysis led to a
ered himself the Court's leading authority. Id. at 329. That case, Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949), held that the exclusionary rule did not apply to the states; the decision was overruled in
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Justice Douglas never claimed any special expertise in criminal
procedure, but, according to one scholar, he had an enormous impact on this area of the law. See
Stephen B. Duke, William 0. Douglas and the Rights of the Accused, in LEGACY OF JUSTIcE DOUG-
LAS, supra note 9, at 140-42. Duke notes a number of Douglas's decisions that are still good law,
and which are part and parcel of the Warren Court's "due process revolution." These include
Argersinger v. Hanlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), and Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
122. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
123. See id. at 365-66.
124. See id. at 362-65.
125. Interview with Charles Miller, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 2, 1989).
126. Id. For Douglas's dissent, see Frank 359 U.S. at 374.
127. Interview with Charles Miller, supra note 125. For Whittaker's concurrence, see Frank,
359 U.S. at 373.
128. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
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bad result, Douglas's unconventional analysis both asked the right ques-
tion and reached the right answer.
Vern Countryman reminds us that scholarship by itself is no guar-
antee that an opinion will be either sound or just, and that in any case,
scholarship "is no substitute for common sense."1 29 Years ago Max Ra-
din commented that judges decide on a result that seems correct. The
necessity of writing an opinion to explain this result gives them the "op-
portunity of working their judgment backward, from a desirable conclu-
sion to one or another of a stock of logical premises." 130 Douglas, a close
friend of Radin, shared this view. In response to critics who charged that
his opinions lacked scholarship, he said that "'for those who liked the
result it was scholarship.' ",131
IV. DOUGLAS AND His ROLE ON THE COURT
Even if Douglas can be better understood as a common law judge,
the question remains whether the common law approach is an acceptable
form of jurisprudence on the nation's highest court, and whether it is a
legitimate means of constitutional interpretation. For those like Edwin
Meese who believe that there is only one correct interpretation of the
Constitution-the view intended by its Framers132 -fidelity to constitu-
tional text and institutional deference is the only acceptable jurispru-
dence. Yet one need not share Meese's extreme views to argue that a
common law approach is inappropriate when dealing with the
Constitution.
In terms of historical perspective, however, the Supreme Court has
been a common law as well as a statutory and constitutional court for
much of its history. Until Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,13 3 a good por-
129. Vern Countryman, Scholarship and Common Sense, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1407, 1409 (1980).
Countryman, in response to a comment that Justice Douglas never developed his argument, said:
Well, I've heard that criticism all my life, and frankly I don't think there's a helluva lot to
it. For instance, in the Dennis case [Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)], he
didn't ring all the chimes on the clear and present danger test, like Frankfurter would have
done. Hejust said that anybody who thinks these birds are a clear and present danger is in
the grip of hysteria .... That was all that needed to be said. There had been enough
chimes rung on clear and present danger .... So he didn't think it was necessary to run
through the thing again.
Interview with Vern Countryman, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, in San Francisco, Cal.
(Aug. 29, 1988).
130. Max Radin, The Theory of Judicial Decisions: Or How Judges Think, 11 A.B.A. J. 358
(1925).
131. Countryman, supra note 129, at 1409 n.14 (quoting Justice Douglas). Justice Douglas told
another friend, Eric Severeid, that judges who write 58 page opinions do so because they do not stick
to the Constitution. Glancy, supra note 93, at 175 n.58.
132. See Meese, supra note 69, at 26.
133. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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tion of the Court's docket involved such traditional common law cases as
contract and negligence. In his excellent study of the Supreme Court
during the Progressive era, John Semonche concluded that the Court re-
sponded to the changes and challenges of the time in the finest common
law tradition. 134 Moreover, even if we accept the notion that constitu-
tional interpretation must be closely tied to the text, there are many gaps
in that eighteenth-century text. As Justice Jackson once explained, the
burden of judicial interpretation is to translate "the majestic generalities
of the Bill of Rights, conceived as part of the pattern of liberal govern-
ment in the eighteenth century, into concrete restraints on officials deal-
ing with the problems of the twentieth century." 135  Translating
"majestic generalities" sounds more like common law practicality than
like wooden fidelity to text and doctrinal niceties.
One wonders whether many of the great changes would have oc-
curred had a majority of the Supreme Court followed the Frankfurter
school. For instance, although Frankfurter did not sympathize with ra-
cial segregation, he questioned the Court's ability to apply the Equal Pro-
tection Clause to reverse Plessy v. Ferguson.136 Douglas, who had
pioneered the resurrection of the Equal Protection Clause, had no
qualms over the results. Moreover, the two-step analysis he formulated
in Skinner 137 made perfectly good sense, and he pushed his colleagues
toward Brown from the time the segregation cases were first heard by the
Court. 138
Could the Warren Court have launched its great revolution in due
process had it slavishly adhered to precedent in its interpretation of the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments? Common sense tells us that the
restraints on police misbehavior ought to be comparable regardless of
whether such action is pursuant to federal or state authority. Similarly,
when the apportionment issue was first heard by the Court in Colegrove
134. See JOHN E. SEMONCHE, CHARTING THE FUTURE: THE SUPREME COURT RESPONDS TO
A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1890-1920, at 426-34 (1978).
135. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
136. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). For Frankfurter's reluctance to proceed in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), see RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 668-70 (1976). Frankfurter
asked his law clerk, Alexander M. Bickel, to determine if the Brown result could be justified in terms
of history and original intent; Bickel found that this was not possible. Bickel later published the
result of his research; see Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation
Decision, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1955).
137. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541-42; see supra text accompanying notes 80-85.
138. See WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, Memorandum for the File, in THE DOUGLAS LETERS 165-67
(Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 1987).
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v. Green,139 Frankfurter lectured his brethren to avoid the "political
thicket," and warned them that the courts had neither the power nor the
wisdom to resolve the problem.1 40 Black, Douglas, and Murphy dis-
sented in that first case,14' and time proved them right. Sixteen years
later in Baker v. Carr, 42 the Court declared the question justiciable143
over Frankfurter's bitter protest;144 two years later, in Reynolds v.
Sims, 145 the Court required that all states apportion their legislatures on
an equitable basis.1 46
Between Baker and Reynolds, however, Douglas answered one of
Frankfurter's major objections-that the courts could not fashion judi-
cially discoverable and manageable standards. In a case that involved
the Georgia county unit system, Justice Douglas set forth a formula that
not only provided judicial guidance, but caught the popular imagination
as well-"one person, one vote."' 147 Despite Justice Harlan's complaint
that the formula "flies in the face of history,"'148 one senses the rightness
of that decision, as well as the common sense of this and the other appor-
tionment decisions--despite their alleged lack of analysis and fidelity to
text.
Douglas has long been considered an activist in that he willingly
reached out to decide issues and to expand the reach of constitutional
protections. However, Douglas viewed himself as a strict construction-
ist; the most dramatic example of this is his (and Justice Black's) absolu-
tist interpretation of the First Amendment Speech Clause' 49 -"Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . .. .95
Although an absolutist position may be an excuse to avoid the problems
of analysis in balancing individual freedom against social order, it also
provides a consistency often lacking in First Amendment analysis.
Thomas Emerson, one of the nation's leading scholars on freedom of
speech, lauded Douglas's use of the First Amendment "as a counter to
139. 328 U.S. 549 (1946) (denying declaratory relief to petitioners who claimed that the voting
districts in Illinois lacked compactness and equality; Court held that this was a nonjusticiable polit-
ical question).
140. See id. at 556.
141. See id. at 566 (Black, J., dissenting).
142. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
143. See id. at 209.
144. See id. at 266 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
145. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
146. See id. at 568.
147. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963).
148. Id. at 384 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
149. See Powe, supra note 8; see also Thomas I. Emerson, Mr. Justice Douglas' Contribution to
the Law: The First Amendment, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 353, 354 (1974).
150. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
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all the pressures of modem life toward conformity .... In this respect,
Justice Douglas has given a totally new dimension to the first
amendment." 15'
Douglas once said that "I'd rather create a precedent than find one.
Because the creation of a precedent in terms of the modem setting means
the adjustment of the Constitution to the needs of the time."1 52 In his
memoirs, Douglas acknowledged the activist label, and in terms that
would have horrified Frankfurter:
My view always has been that anyone whose life, liberty or property
was threatened or impaired by any branch of government-whether
the President or one of his agencies, or Congress, or the courts (or any
counterpart in a state regime)-had a justiciable controversy and could
properly repair to a judicial tribunal for vindication of his rights. 153
This is certainly not the voice of judicial restraint; it is the voice of the
common law.
Yet there is much to criticize about Douglas's opinions. Even when
he correctly decided difficult questions he often failed to explain how he
reached these laudable results. A former law clerk and Douglas admirer,
Lucas Powe, has written that Douglas did not take doctrine seriously,
and failed to appreciate that others,
including those not wedded to the judicial conservatism of Harvard,
did take doctrine seriously. With his acknowledged abilities he could
have played the doctrinal game superbly,154 but he saw doctrine as a
waste of time and he had non-legal activities that were more pressing
than authoring rationalizations for those silly enough to believe
them.155
Douglas, however, had nothing but contempt for those who failed to un-
derstand the meaning of his decisions unless they had an accompanying
law review article attached as explanation. "I wrote for the common
man," he declared, "hoping I could help him see the main contours, and,
seeing them, better understand the high vantage point we have reached
with our form of government." 56
One problem with complicated and unreadable opinions is that
although they may appeal to the specialist, they are misunderstood by
151. Emerson, supra note 149, at 356. Emerson is not an uncritical admirer of Justice Douglas;
see supra text accompanying note 106.
152. Glancy, supra note 93, at 164 (quoting CBS Reports: Mr. Justice Douglas (CBS television
broadcast, Sept. 6, 1972)).
153. COURT YEARS, supra note 3, at 55-56.
154. Chief Justice Rehnquist believes that some of the opinions Justice Douglas wrote earlier in
his career regarding corporate finance and securities regulation show that he not only was a master
of the law in those areas, but of the businesses involved, inside and out. Interview with William H.
Rehnquist, Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, in Washington, D.C. (May 17, 1988).
155. Powe, Douglas after Fifty Years, supra note 8, at 270.
156. WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, AN ALMANAC OF LIBERTY, at vii (1954).
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the general public. In 1977, Irving R. Kaufman, then-Chief Judge of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, urged his fellow
judges to write their opinions in a more intelligible form:
Judges often play the role of teacher or leader in shaping the public's
view. As the judicial opinion is the essential document of the third
branch of government, the judge should explain his action in terms
that enable the reader to understand precisely what he has done and
why he has done it. The democratic character of the courts' active
law-making role springs from judicial participation in the marketplace
of ideas, and courts, like legislatures, must mobilize general under-
standing of their decisions. 157
Douglas attempted this, and one can hardly deny that an intelligent
layperson would find Douglas's opinions far more accessible than those
of Frankfurter.t58
Another problem with involved analytical rationalizations is that
they can ignore common sense. Although stare decisis might serve as a
starting point in judicial decisionmaking, Douglas remained aware of
how uncertain a reed the past might be. Established law, he told Eric
Severeid, was not a. sure guide because the past did not always have a
relevance to the present. "'I've always thought that on a constitutional
decision, that stare decisis, that is, established law, was really no sure
guideline because what did the guys do-the judges who sat there in
1875-know about, say, electronic surveillance? They didn't know any-
thing about it. . . .Why take their wisdom?' "159 The law survived,
Douglas said in 1949, because it adapted to new conditions. 160 Prece-
dents once correct might no longer be so. He called it a "healthy prac-
tice (too infrequently followed) for a court to reexamine its own
doctrine." 161 Again, one hears the voice of the common law judge. 162
157. Irving R. Kaufman, Helping the Public Understand and Accept Judicial Decisions, 63
A.B.A. J. 1567 (1977). This is not to say that only short and simplistic opinions can do this. Louis
Brandeis wrote to educate his brethren; his opinions, both majority and dissent, are models of judi-
cial craftsmanship and analysis. As his law clerk Paul Freund recalled, after extensive work on a
case Brandeis would often say: "The opinion is now convincing,.., but how can we make it more
instructive?" PHILIPPA STRUM, Louis D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE 347 (1984).
158. See J. Louis Campbell, III, How Opinions Can Persuade: A Case Study of William 0. Doug-
las, 29 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 231 (1982). Justice Douglas, however, seems to have eschewed adopt-
ing the role of teacher. His clerk for the 1951 Term, Marshall Small, recalled that in a tax case
Justice Douglas wrote a very brief opinion. Small suggested that he expand it, and explained that
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone had always attempted to elucidate the reasoning in tax cases. Justice
Douglas abruptly snapped: "I don't write law review articles." Interview with Marshall Small, in
San Francisco, Cal. (Aug. 26, 1988).
159. Glancy, supra note 93, at 175 n.66 (quoting CBS Reports: Mr. Justice Douglas (CBS televi-
sion broadcast, Sept. 6, 1972)).
160. See William o. Douglas, "tare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 746 (1949).
161. Id.
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Douglas has been further criticized for failing to build coalitions; he
did not seem to care if he spoke for a majority or only for himself.163 His
colleague and fellow-activist on the Court, William J. Brennan, believes
that Douglas cared passionately about the results in important cases be-
cause he did not care to be mistaken. 164 But, because he could not or
would not play the game of coalition building, and because he would not
explain some of his opinions to influence other judges in later cases,
Douglas-given his abilities and ideas-exercised far less influence than
he should have. A few years before he stepped down from the bench, he
conceded that " 'I haven't been much of a proselytizer on the Court ....
I've had the theory that the only soul I had to save was my own.' ",165
These criticisms are true. Future historians will likely wonder how
a man who exercised such influence on the development of American
constitutional law enjoyed such a poor reputation. In the end, however,
Douglas did exercise influence. According to Kenneth Karst, a self-de-
scribed "second-generation disciple of Felix Frankfurter,"' 166 Douglas:
went his own way; he did not make concessions-and no Justice of his
era did more to remake the landscape of constitutional doctrine.
Justice Douglas was the unrivaled leader of the most important
constitutional development of his time: the growth of the equal protec-
tion clause. He was also a major figure in the revival of substantive
due process as a protection of personal liberties. His leadership, in
other words, was precisely doctrinal leadership.
What was missing from his opinions was the logic of the
syllogism.' 67
162. One might point here to one of the great common law decisions of this century: Judge
Cardozo's opinion in Macpherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916), which brought
products liability law into the twentieth century by eliminating the need for privity and by establish-
ing the liability of a manufacturer of a defective wheel to the plaintiff, the ultimate (though not
immediate) purchaser. To do this, Cardozo-whom many consider the greatest common law judge
of this century-had to ignore precedent and write an innovative opinion to reach the right result.
163. See Kenneth L. Karst, Dedication: William 0. Douglas, 1898-1980, 27 UCLA L. REv. 511
(1980). In interviews with his clerks, I raised this issue. They all agreed that although he cared
passionately, he would not try to persuade the other Justices to adopt his opinions. The following
comment from Jerome Falk is typical:
I asked him about it, I said, "Why don't you talk to [the other Justices]?" And he said
several times that was not his view of what was appropriate. He would put his views out,
and see what happened. He was perfectly willing to talk to people about changes, but he
would never call one of them up and say, "What do I have to do to get you on board here?"
Never.
Interview with Jerome Falk, in San Francisco, Cal. (Aug. 26, 1988).
164. Interview with William J. Brennan, Jr., Associate Justice of the United States Supreme
Court, in Washington, D.C. (May 17, 1988).
165. SIMON, supra note 4, at 250 (quoting Justice Douglas).
166. Karst, supra note 163, at 511.
167. Id.
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This is a generous and fair assessment. Douglas would have been among
the first to admit that the logic of the syllogism was indeed missing. In
terms of the common law, however, Holmes reminded us a century ago
that the life of the law has not been logic, but experience, and all sorts of
things in the real world-including the prejudices of the judges-had a
great deal more to do with the law than the syllogism. 68
V. CONCLUSION
I disagree with Professor White's assessment that William 0. Doug-
las can or should be characterized as an anti-judge because he refused to
adhere to formalistic rules.1 69 Nor do I agree that, as a second-genera-
tion Harvard disciple of Frankfurter claimed, Douglas was the "'loose
gun on the deck of the sinking ship of American liberal jurispru-
dence.' "170 Rather, as White correctly characterizes him, Douglas was
an individualist. As such, he brought important values to the Court that
other Justices did not have or appreciate. If my thesis is correct, his
common law proclivities also contributed to the work of the Court in his
lengthy tenure.
Certainly, we would not want a Court of William 0. Douglas clones
anymore than we would want nine Felix Frankfurters. But for the Court
to be responsive to changing societal needs (as was the Warren Court), it
needs a nonconformist, results-oriented judge who asks the right ques-
tions-even if he or she cannot rationalize those results in a given man-
ner. As Louis Jaffe wrote:
[We] should perhaps rid ourselves of the implicit assumption that there
is any single model of judicial greatness. Once we recognize that the
Supreme Court is a supreme policy-maker we should welcome on the
Court a variety of talents and attributes-the "activist," the exponent
of "judicial restraint," the liberal, the conservative, the moralist, the
skeptic. Each can be great in his own way; each can contribute to the
institutional product of the Court. 171
For all his faults, Douglas played a critical role on the Supreme
Court for thirty-five years. He asked the right questions, and more often
than not, he got the right answers. In so doing, he helped his colleagues
on the bench keep law sensitive to the needs of a rapidly changing soci-
ety. As the Supreme Court noted in the nineteenth century, the "flexibil-
ity and capacity for growth and adaptation is the peculiar boast and
168. HOLMES, supra note 55, at 1.
169. See White, supra note 26, at 18.
170. Karst, supra note 163, at 511 n.1 (quoting HARV. L. REc., Feb. 8, 1980, at 1).
171. Louis Jaffe, Was Brandeis an Activist? The Search for Intermediate Premises, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 986, 1003 (1967).
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excellence of the common law." 172 In this century, William 0. Douglas
kept that common law tradition alive.
172. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 530 (1884).
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